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Data Protection Authority5 This article has been written in the contex
a Controlled Environment (www.miauce.org
0267-3649/$ – see front matter ª 2009 Prof Y
doi:10.1016/j.clsr.2009.03.008a b s t r a c t
The author starts by questioning the main privacy challenges raised by our present and
future information society viewed as a ‘‘global village’’. Apart from a comparison with the
traditional village of our parents, he identifies the two complementary and not disso-
ciable facets of our privacy: the right to seclusion and the right to participate fully in our
society. According to the first German Constitutional Court recognizing the right to
informational self-determination as a new constitutional right, he underlines the need to
analyse the data protection as a tool for ensuring both the citizens’ dignity and our
democracy.
The second part describes the three major changes of our technological environment:
firstly, the tremendous and continuous growth of capacity of our information and
communication systems; secondly, the Internet revolution with Web 2.0, the multiplica-
tion of digital identities and the convergence of all infrastructures and, finally, the ubiq-
uitous computing. That evolution generates new privacy threats. In order to face correctly
these new privacy risks, the author suggests the adaptation of our privacy legislation. Most
notably, he proposes the adoption of certain principles available in environmental regu-
lation, viz. the strong liability both of terminal equipment producers and of the infra-
structure operators.
The final chapter addresses three caveats to the data protection lawyers. Please, stop acting
only like a lawyer. Open your mind. The information society needs a ‘Technology
Assessment’ approach and better attention to the solution the technology itself might
offer. Finally, the author underlines the absolute need to come back to the two keywords of
the data protection legislation: transparency and proportionality and to take fully into
consideration the way by which the technology might enhance the efficiency of those
principles.
ª 2009 Prof Yves Poullet. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction tomorrow’s technology will combine mobile phones,1.1. The information society: some questions
Information about us is circulating everywhere on the web of
today’s communication network. More than 1.5 billion people
use e-mail. Mobile phone use is surging forward andt of the MIAUCE project (
) IST Call 5, FP6-2005-IST
ves Poullet. Published bycomputers and televisions. The average single European is
listed in around 500 different data files. Seeing these numbers
raises a certain number of questions.
 What information is circulating about us? We can guess
some of it, but some we know nothing about! The methodsMulti-modal Interactions Analysis and exploration of Users within
-5).
Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Identifiers (RFIDs) which can be read at distance, through
mobile phones1 for example; other information we
ourselves supply such as what I place in FACEBOOK, traffic
and tracking information, my fingerprints, the DNA of my
dog, my keyword searches on my preferred search engine,
and how my eyes move.2
 Who processes this information? We immediately think of
our banker, insurer, our employer, or the various levels of
government and their departments; this is obvious, but how
many others are spying on us? One company keeping an eye
on us is Cyber Click, a cyber marketing company that
operates by placing cookies on your computer when you
visit one of their client’s sites. This company, recently
purchased by Google, collects information through the
cookies placed on the hard disk and establishes a consumer
profile and then adapts and personalizes the publicity
banners.3
Simple membership in social networks like LINKELDEN,
MY SPACE or FACEBOOK permits far removed ‘‘friends’’ to
use the information available on us in unsuspected ways or
for companies to see our chain of friendships and use this to
unanticipated commercial ends.
 . and to do what? Here too, some of the uses of the infor-
mation are clear, or perhaps only apparently so; in other
cases, it is less clear. Who would have thought that Amazon,
the well-known American online bookseller, would create
programs for ‘‘adaptive pricing’’, that is, book prices that
change automatically depending on the demand of their1 It is possible to combine these different collecting methods. So
apart from readers installed within mobiles, it is possible to
detect the presence of a person close to an object where an RFID
tag is enshrined. On the experiences developed in US and the
debates raised by these combined technologies, read N. KING,
«Direct Marketing, Mobile Phones and Consumer Privacy:
Ensuring Adequate Disclosure and Consent Mechanisms for
Emerging Mobile Advertising Practices», Federal Communications
Law Journal, March 2008, 2, Vol. 60, p. 229 and ff.
2 In the context of the MIAUCE project, an application analysed
precisely consists in the automated analysis of the face’s
expressions and emotions in order to detect the individual’s
reactions regarding TV programs collected through a webcam
installed on an interactive WebTV.
3 On that point, see M.A. FROOMKIN, «Regulation and
Computing and Information Technology. Flood Control on the
Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash and
Distributed Databases, 15, Jour Law & Com., 1996, p. 395 et seq.
(this author evokes a ‘‘consumer myopia and badly informed’’); J.
COHEN, «Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject
as Object», 52 Stanford Law J., 2000, p. 1373 and ff.clients, calculated by sophisticated formulas incorporating
client profiles. RFID technology4 in employees clothing can
certainly help to easily and accurately ‘‘clock in’’ workers,
but the same technology can also be used to follow the
movements of employees throughout the day and underline
where and when the movements are not ideal from the
employer’s point of view – long breaks in the cafeteria.1.2. From paranoia to the global village
Do not these questions lead inevitably certain a malaise or
even paranoia? To this frightening thought, some will answer:
openness is a virtue; in any case, what does an honest man
have to fear. They compare the Internet to a traditional village.
Don’t we all live in a ‘‘global village’’,5 surely an image to calm
and reassure! Traditional village life was where everyone
knew (almost) everyone else’s business, and this was all to the
good – wasn’t it?1.3. The plan
The first part of this paper will compare the two types of
villages mentioned. It will be seen that it is a misleading
comparison. The examination will find it difficult to blindly
support the supposed universal benefits of transparency,
proudly proclaimed by social networks such as LINKELDEN,
MY SPACE or FACEBOOK.
Starting from this comparison, we can examine two
aspects of private life and the dangers it encounters. Ideas
borrowed from the American author Solove6 regarding ‘‘Big
Brother’’ and ‘‘The Trial’’ will help us in this.
The second part will describe some characteristics of
the ongoing changes in ICT (information and4 About that technology of the infinitively small, Y. POULLET, A.
ROUVROY and D. DARQUENNES, The Law encounters commu-
nication and information technologies: the case of RFIDs, in
Identity, Privacy and New Technologies, Special Issue, International
Journal of Intellectual Property Management, 2008, pp. 372–395.
Thanks to nanotechnologies, terminal equipment, i.e. the
micro-processor which, depending on the occasion, collects,
processes, emits or receives data or external communications,
and sometimes is limited to one or the other of these operations,
may see its size reduced to the breadth of a pinhead or a grain of
sand, so much so that one can speak of «Smart Dust». These
developments lead to the possibility of largely invisible interac-
tions between ‘things’ (the computer mouse, goods, clothing, etc.)
or people on whom these microprocessors and information
systems have been implanted, based on information so collected
and other information. This interaction will help the individuals
carrying these devices in their everyday lives in doing their work
or surveying their activities. All of these applications by which
‘‘people will be surrounded by intelligent and interactive inter-
faces embedded in the everyday objects around us and an envi-
ronment recognizing and responding to the presence of
individuals in an invisible way’’ has been described as ‘‘ambient
intelligence’’ by the European Union.
5 The «Global village» is a wording invented by Marshall
McLuhan in his book: ‘‘The medium is the Message’’ in order to
qualify the impact of the globalisation, the media and the ICT.
6 D.J. SOLOVE, The Digital Person, New York University Press,
New York and London, 2004.
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nature of these technologies and the almost infinite
capacity of the networks raise questions about two other
kinds of evolution.
The first arises from new programs and uses of the web
that we find in the so-called Web 2.0, and in what is called the
Semantic Web. The second underlines how information
systems are ubiquitous, what some identify as the birth of
‘‘ambient intelligence’’. Two trends arise from this evolution:
the first is the loss of the boundary between private and public
space; the second is the supposed ‘‘overall responsibility’’ of
each individual, which leads us to think about integrating
some of the principles and concepts from environmental law
into the law concerning ICT.
These reflections bring us to a third question regarding the
necessity to rethink and perhaps reinvent our legislation to
protect personal information if we want our liberties pro-
tected. We will see that the protection of our private lives is
a necessary condition to secure our liberty, and even the
survival of our democracy.9 On that point, read J. RAYMAN («Driving to the Panopticon: A
Philosophical Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the
Highway of the Future», 11 Santa Clara Computer & Techn. Law
Journal, 1995, p. 22 et seq.), J. COHEN («Examined Lives: Informa-
tional Privacy and the Subject as Object», 52 Stanford Law Rev.,
2000, p. 1373 and ff.) and H. NISSENBAUM («Privacy as contextual
Integrity», 79 George Washington Law Rev., 2004, p. 150 and ff.) who
asserts that ‘‘the freedom from scrutiny and zones of ‘‘relative insu-
larity’’ are necessary conditions for formulating goals, values, concep-
tions of self, and principles of action because they provide venues in
which people are free to experiment, act and decide without giving
account to others or being fearful of retribution’’.
10 About RFID implant’s body and medical applications, read the
Opinion expressed by the European Group on Ethics and Science
dated from March 5, 2005: ‘‘Ethical Aspects of ICT implants in human
body’’.
11 The question of consumers’ surveillance and of their online
behaviours’ follow-up has been commented and analysed by the
FTC (US Federal Trade Commission) in different reports: «Online
Behavioral Advertising: Moving the Discussion Forward to Possible2. What does privacy mean? – lessons from
Kafka and Orwell
2.1. A misleading comparison to the traditional village
2.1.1. ‘Un’openness or opacity as a virtue
Look at the comparison sketched out in the introduction. Does
the global village function like a traditional village? We see
that in a traditional village, the knowledge we have of one
another is limited, a man’s home is his castle. This private
space is sacred. It is vital to allow me a place to recharge my
batteries, away from prying eyes. In the same way, the law
must protect my private communication with others. This
preoccupation justifies the primary concept of our right to
a private life, as inscribed in article 8 of European Convention
of Human Rights in 1950.7
Moments of ‘‘discretion, anonymity and solitude’’ or
‘‘escape and withdrawal’’8 are necessary for an individual to
think about or to question their life, or to develop relation-
ships with others. Love and friendship are not easily
expressed in public; they require certain discretion and
a selective privacy. In the traditional village, the role of the
walls is to protect intimacy, to allow individuals the freedom
to abandon their public personas and to be free in their private
life. It is for this reason that the ‘‘right to opacity’’ is a neces-
sary condition to find authenticity within oneself or in contact
with others. The necessity to provide this opaqueness or7 The original conception of the ‘‘right to privacy’’ deeply is
linked with the principle of dignity and was considered as
a condition of the free development of the personality: the
protection and leads to protect the family and home intimacy and
of the correspondence.
8 R. GAVISON, «Privacy and the limits of Law», 89 Yale Law
Journal, 1980, p. 433 and ff.reticence is explained by the need of people to have a place
where their personality and person can develop.9
As we will see in the text that follows, this ‘‘right to isola-
tion’’ is more necessary now than ever before in our contem-
porary society and fully justifies the need to put in place new
legislative safeguards to protect this ‘‘right to isolation’’ given
the technological and socio-political challenges of today.
2.1.2. The virtue of opacity – bad mouthed and badly
manhandled
The need of each of us, to have a certain opaqueness to the
information society when safely behind the walls of our
home, is sorely tested today. Our walls no longer hide us.
We could cite the infrared surveillance equipment used by
the police and military to detect movement inside buildings,
but of much greater concern are ICTs that are much more
invasive. For example, RFID chips, in our clothing, our
consumer goods, and appliances (the smart fridge) or even our
own bodies,10 inform observers far removed from our homes.
They use the network to detect the messages these chips send
out, and can detect our actions: simply drinking our favourite
juice, our level of stress waking up, or our movements.
Another example, that is a little more obvious, is that any use
of your web browser is logged by your ISP (Internet Service
Provider). They can know which pages we visit, what infor-
mation we looked for, or what products or services we are now
or shortly planning to use.11
Finally, the example of Gmail, their server can identify all
the keywords inside all our e-mails. In sum, we are constantly
watched and spied upon in ways and in places that were
previously inviolate.Self-regulatory Principles», available on the FTC website: http://
www.ftc.gov.bcp/ with the debate held on November 1 and 2,
2007 on the theme: «Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting and
Technology». Voir également World Privacy Forum, The Network
Advertising Initiative: Falling at Consumer Protection and Self-
regulation, publié le 2 Nov. 2007 sur le site: http://www.
worldprivacyforum.org. See also very recently (Jan. 13, 2009) the
complaint addressed by the Center for Digital Democracy before
the FTC. The FTC complaint provides valuable insight into the
developing business practices of mobile advertising and who the
industry players are in the U.S., and to some extent,
internationally.
15 About the reversal of the evidence in profiling applications
cases, D.J. STEINBOCK, Data Matching, Data Mining and Due
Process, 40 GA Law Rev (2005), 1, p. 82 and ff.
16 About that distinction between the two facets and their
intrinsic linkage, A. ROUVROY and Y. POULLET, The right to
informational self-determination and the value of self-
development – Reassessing the importance of privacy for
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A second difference from our traditional village is whether we
control our image in daily life. We know, or suspect, that our
comings and goings, late nights or early mornings, change of
clothing or car, new job or job loss, are in the public domain
and that the disagreeable neighbour or the friend who calls to
congratulate us or to tell us of their problems are all ‘‘in the
know’’. We can, based on this daily feedback, adapt and adjust
our behaviour, play this role or that and hide certain choices.
To this extent, we master our environment. However, what
about in our global village? Do we have the same control?
Absolutely not! Look for example at technologies such as
‘‘one-to-one marketing’’ or ‘‘adaptive pricing’’. Here the
company based on our profile adjusts the price in line with
their expectation of our interest to buy (adaptive pricing) or in
the case of banner publicity change it (one-to-one marketing)
in line with our buying behaviour. These systems are based on
the use of profiling techniques that we look at next.
2.1.4. Profiling techniques
These techniques use statistical methods which cross-index-
ing randomly selected information from large databases (data
warehouses) and deduce an individual’s behaviour based on
his membership in a group or, more precisely, his profile.12
In this way, collections of information from various sour-
ces and databases allow us to deduce with a certainty of 89%
that purchases by such and such a consumer, at this or that
grocery store, at that time, on that particular day, clearly
indicates that the person is single, likes long distance travel,
and may engage in fraud. The profile of the terrorist is
deduced by cross-indexing information from various data-
bases, the population roll, the use of credit cards, movements
detected through use of mobile phones, brand name discount
cards, use of medications, etc.13 The drop in the cost of storing
information, the level of sophistication of the analytical tools
and the sheer processing power available on modern
computers means that sorts and searches can find the correct
profile (at least statistically) that can then be compared with
the real information about the real individual. In short, the
‘‘man in the street’’ finds his profile based on data that has
little connection to him and even less connection to the use
made of this information and of whose existence he is largely
ignorant.1412 About these practices and the need to regulate them, J.M.
DINANT, C. LAZARO, Y. POULLET, A. ROUVROY, ‘‘Profiling and Data
Protection’’, Report addressed to the Convention 108 Consultative
Committee, September 2008, available on the Council of Europe
website. Voir également, l’excellent ouvrage rassemblant des
articles sur le thème du profilage, édité par M. HILDEBRANDT et S.
GUTWIRTH, Profiling the European Citizen, Cross disciplinary
Perspectives, Springer Science, Dordrecht, 2008, pp. 303–344.
13 On ‘‘data mining’’ applications developed by the public
administrations especially for public security purposes, read D.J.
SOLOVE, «Data Mining and The Security vs. Liberty Debate», 75
University Chicago Law Review, 2008, p. 343 and ff. The author
pinpoints in particular the US MATRIX (Multistate Anti-Terrorism
Information Exchange) program.
14 M. HILDEBRANT, «Profiling and the Identity of the European
Citizens», in Profiling the European Citizens, Crossdisciplinary
Perspectives, M. HILDEBRANT and S. GUTWIRTH (eds), Dordrecht,
Springer, 303–344.Worse still, this information provides the profiler a better
understanding of the person concerned then the person has of
themselves. If the person concerned rejects the profile or
indicates that a decision based on it about him is wrong, it is
up to the profiled person to prove the mistake.15
2.1.5. Social networks
After having read the ‘privacy settings’ of FACEBOOK or other
social networks and understood the restrictions on the flow of
information about us to our close friends we think we control
our Internet profile. A quick reading of the ‘privacy notices’ on
these sites will end our illusions. Advertising we receive
because we are the friend of so and so, that we are supposed be
interested in too, keeping our personal information on file after
we have cancelled our contract; these are examples of how in
fact we do not master the personal data out there about us.
2.1.6. Two sides or facets of privacy16
We see that the individual is more and more transparent and
operates in the virtual world that is more and more opaque. In
fact, this is how the Internet operates. It undermines our
privacy which legislation is trying to protect. If legislation
provides new rights of protection, it is because personal data
protection is founded on our existing ideas of privacy. This
legislation looks, firstly, to establish the right to intimacy or
more generally the right to withdraw from society and,
secondly, at the possibility to develop our capacities to choose.
These two aspects of privacy are not incompatible, quite the
opposite in fact. They both establish a common objective: to
allow the individual fully to participate in social life. To reach
this objective means that either the right to seclusion or rather
the freedom not to be exposed (the right not to participate in
the information society) is a necessary condition for the
development of the individual.17 This is in the sense that it
allows independent thought and the right to choose a way of
life and relationships with others and at the same timedemocracy, in Reinventing Data Protection, Proceedings of the
Colloquium held at Brussels, Nov. 2007, Springer Verlag, 2009. See
also but grounding the first facet on privacy and the second one
on Data Protection, P. DE HERT and S. GUTWIRTH, ‘‘Privacy, Data
Protection and law enforcement. Opacity of the individuals and
Transparency of the power’’, in Privacy and the Criminal Law, E.
CLAES et al. (ed.), Interscientia, Antwerpen–Oxford, 2006, p. 74.
17 See, in the same sense, R. SUNSTEIN, Why Societies Need
Dissent, Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 157–158: «The Right
to privacy (.) can be illuminated if we see it as an effort to allow
people to escape reputation pressures. Suppose, for example, that
people are allowed to read whatever they like in the privacy of
their own homes, or that actions which are forbidden in public,
either by law or by norms, are legally protected if done in private.
Or suppose that law creates safeguards against public observa-
tion of what is done in certain sanctuaries. If this is so, the
privacy right will operate to reduce or to eliminate the pressure
imposed by the actual or perceived views of others (.) privacy
rights helps to insulate people from conformity.»
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while maintaining control of one’s data profile and the
manner in which it can be used.18
We see that the two possibilities are intimately linked –
necessary and complementary – one to the other. The first is
necessary to the second, in as much as it allows the individual
to create both independence and identity so that his place in
society (‘‘privacy’’ as a condition of liberty of expression) can
be established as well as the respect of his rights. This is done
by controlling the information flow (the control of information
that others have) and assuring one’s right to be secluded and
anonymous – a feedback mechanism of the second right
which reinforces the first. In other words, we can only be part
of the information society in all serenity if we are able to have
a minimum of opacity, a ‘‘secret garden’’, as a condition of our
liberty (for example the possibility of remaining anonymous
or use a screen name, or to have the capacity to simply to turn
off the machine through which we can be located).
Both rights are at present suffering problems. Solove6 uses
two fictional characters from well-known novels to illustrate
how technologies weaken our right of privacy and profoundly
influence the relationship between the people who hold the
information and the people who the information concerns.19 BVerfG, Karlsruhe, Dec. 15, 1983, EuGRZ, 1983, p. 171 and ff. See
comments by E.H. RIEDL, «New bearings in German Data Protec-
tion», Human Rights Law Journal, 1984, Vol. 5, no. 1, p. 67 and ff.; H.
BURKERT, «Le judgement du Tribunal Constitutionnel fédéral
allemand sur le recensement démographique et ses conse-
quences», Dr. Inf., 1985, p. 8 and ff. See also, E. BROUWER, Digital
Borders and Real Rights, Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Pub., 2007, 501 pp.
20 ‘‘The value and dignity of the person based on free self-
determination as a member of a free society is the focal point of
the order established by the Basic Law. The general personality2.2. The information society: between Kafka’s ‘The Trial’
and Orwell’s ‘Big Brother’
2.2.1. Big Brother
The first character we will look at is Orwell’s ‘Big Brother’ from
the famous book ‘‘1984’’. This first reference shows the extent
that those that control information have power over those
concerned, whether they are citizens, employees or
consumers; we are each more and more transparent to ‘Big
Brother’ who looks to regulate our behaviour for our own
good. For those who hold it, information is power. Whoever
has information about others can adapt their decisions and
actions in line with what they know or have deduced about
them. He knows what to expect and can better respond to any
expressed need or even reshape this if needed.
It is no doubt urgent to establish some new rights (we will
come back to this point later); a certain balance of infor-
mation control must be re-established if we do not wish to
see those about whom this information is known reduced to
mere objects. We are rightly concerned about the power that
Google, or its affiliates, have or could have, in diverse
domains.
We hesitate to imagine the knowledge Google, today’s ‘Big
Brother’, has already collected about each of us, collated,
cross-referenced, and deduced from the combined use or
non-use of their products and services. These include the
search engine (Google Search Engine); e-mail service (Gmail);
their online news services (Google News); their geographic
service (Google Earth) and their online publicity services,
developed by their subsidiary ‘.Double-click’. The latter,
thanks to their invisible hyperlink technology, collect18 About this debate, A. ROUVROY, Privacy, Data Protection, and
the Unprecedented Challenges of Ambient Intelligence, in Studies
in Ethics, Law, and Technology, 2008, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.
com/abstract¼101.3984.information about millions of users surfing on millions of
sites connected to Double-click.
2.2.2. The Trial
The second case we can look at is ‘The Trial’ written by Franz
Kafka in the sixties. The story concerns a character on trial for
unspecified crimes, with nameless accusers, for unknown
reasons. Here we can see how the systems surrounding us are
completely opaque and obscure. We do not know what
information is collected, for what purpose, who it is for, or
how much there is of it. This situation of concealment can
lead to certain fears and adopting normative behaviour in line
with what we think ‘others’ expect of us. Psychologists have
shown that behaviours are adaptive and when we know or
think we know we are being watched, we no longer dare to
express our natural joy or anger – no doubt suppressed to be
expressed at another time and place, though not necessarily
for the better.2.3. The decision of the German Constitutional Court
regarding the 1983 census: the fundamental importance of
privacy in our democracies
2.3.1. From the confirmation of the right to informational
self-determination
As with the case that Kafka denounces, one of the first decisions
of the German Constitutional Court of 198319 asserts the right to
data protection regarding personal data collected through the
census, whileunanimously approving the legislation organising
the census arrangements. According to the Karlsruhe judges,
the law contained serious errors and omissions: no clear defi-
nition of the objectives, no clear or transparent procedure for
following or identifying inaccurate information regarding
German citizens. These deficiencies constituted an attack on
human dignity and the proper development of the person.20 The
German Court underlined the dangerous consequences to
democracy if a closed and obscure system handles the infor-
mation. In particular, it raised the point that individuals auto-
matically and perhaps unconsciously self-censor theirright as laid down in Arts 2 (1) i.c.w 1(1) GG serves to protect these
values (.)’’. The German decision explicitly acknowledges that
‘‘The general personality law (.) gains in importance if one bears
in mind modern developments with attendant dangers to the
human personality.’’
c o m p u t e r l a w & s e c u r i t y r e v i e w 2 5 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 2 1 1 – 2 2 6216behaviour for fear of being considered as deviant or even simply
eccentric by others.21
The court underlined the fear people have of the unfav-
ourable consequences, should others know their behaviour.
The court decided that (information) technology might ‘‘might
destroy not only our chance to develop, but also the common
good, because self-determination is a necessary condition to
a free democratic society built on the capacity of its citizens to
act and cooperate’’.
2.3.2. . on to democracy
In light of the preceding points, we must establish regulations
to protect privacy and guarantee the protection of informa-
tion. These measures are in fact necessary because they help
individuals to keep and to develop the capacity to act inde-
pendently or cooperate with others within society so that it
can remain democratic, based on the mutual respect of
differences and the free development of each individual.22
This decision of the German Constitutional Court has been
followed, point for point, by another decision23 taken by the
same court, regarding a Lander’s legislation, which allowed21 ‘‘The possibility of inspection and of gaining influence has
increased to a degree hitherto unknown, and may influence the
individuals’ behaviour by the psychological pressure exerted by
public interests. Even under certain conditions of modern infor-
mation processing technology, individual self-determination
presupposes that the individuals left with the freedom of decision
about actions to be taken or to be omitted, including the possibility
to follow that decision in practice. If someone cannot predict with
sufficient certainty which information about himself in certain
areas is known to his social milieu and cannot estimate sufficiently
the knowledge of parties to whom communication may be possibly
be made, he is crucially inhibited in his freedom to plan or to decide
freely and without being subject to any pressure influence. If
someone is uncertain whether deviant behaviour is noted down
and stored permanent as information, or is applied or passed, he
will try not to attract attention by such behaviour. If he reckons
that participation in an assembly or a citizen’s initiative will be
registered officially and that personal risks might result from it, he
may possibly renounce the exercise of his respective rights. This
would not only impact his chances of development but would have also
impact the common good (‘‘Gemeinwohl’’), because self-determination is
an elementary functional condition of a free democratic society based on
its citizen’s capacity to act and to cooperate.’’
22 On that point, S. GUTWIRTH and P. DE HERT, ‘‘Regulating
Profiling in a democratic constitutional State’’ in M. HILDEBRANT
and S. GUTWIRTH, Profiling the European Citizen, Cross disciplinary
Perspectives, Springer Science, Dordrecht, 2008.
23 BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07 vom 27.2.2008, Absatz-Nr. (1-333): http://
www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20080227_1bvr037007.html
(MMR, 2008, 303, annotated by Th. HOEREN, p. 366 and ff). That
decision grants to the individual a new Constitutional right to the
security and integrity in the use of Information System and does
consider the respect to the integrity of the virtual home what
constitutes the terminal equipment on the same footing than the
physical home.police entry into computers at distance. These two decisions
show how the protection of privacy is a fundamental and
necessary condition to the democratic process. What it
implies is that a state that respects the development of each
individual is a necessary condition for other democratic
freedoms.24 Can we imagine real freedom of expression if
everyone feels that each of his or her actions and choices is
observed? Can we imagine freedom of movement in a world
where our mobile, with some help from RFID, follows our
every move and constantly informs us of various events?
Privacy, now protected through personal data protection
legislation, thus becomes ‘the’ fundamental freedom, and the
necessary condition for all other freedoms.3. Some characteristics of recent new uses of
information and communication technologies
3.1. New technologies.new risks to privacy
Asserting the importance of our private life leads us to look at
characteristics of the new technology itself, to better under-
stand the implications on our behaviour, our life, and our
capacity for self-realization. The European Data Protection
directives are intended to deal with the problems of process-
ing, as we understood them in 1995.
Far be it for us to suggest that ideas established at the dawn
of the Internet revolution, no longer provide a proper base to
protect our liberties; however, the Internet revolution,
convergence of communication technologies, increasing
storage, computer capacity and ambient intelligence lead us
to think about new approach or at least to examine additional
possibilities to protect our privacy in today’s world, which are
both effective and adequate. No doubt, changes in technology
are not the only considerations to take into account when
looking at present-day risks. Contrary to what Lessig25
suggests, changes in technology are not the only reason to
revise our laws. Changes in socio-political circumstances, for
example the horror of 9/11 and its aftermath, also create new24 The link between privacy as a condition for an expression free,
original and full of respect of the differences, from one part, and
the democracy, from the other part, is developed by number of
authors. See notably, Jürgen HABERMAS, Between Facts and Norms,
MIT Press, 1996); P.M. SCHWARTZ, and W.M. TREANOR, ‘‘The
New Privacy’’, Michigan Law Review, 101, 2003, p. 216; James E.
FLEMMING, ‘‘Securing Deliberative Autonomy’’, Stanford Law
Review, Vol. 48, No. 1, 1995, pp. 1–71, arguing that the bedrock
structure of deliberative autonomy secures basic liberties that are
significant preconditions for persons’ ability to deliberate about
and make certain fundamental decisions affecting their destiny,
identity, or way of life. On deliberative democracy, see James E.
FLEMMING, ‘‘Securing Deliberative Democracy’’, Fordham Law
Review, Vol. 72, p. 1435, 2004.
25 L. LESSIG, Code and other Laws of Cyberspace, New York, Basic
Book, 2000. For more reflection about the way by which new
technologies, especially technologies of ambient intelligence,
modify drastically our way of life and creates new risks of privacy
threats, read A. ROUVROY, Privacy, Data Protection, and the
Unprecedented Challenges of Ambient Intelligence, in Studies in
Ethics, Law, and Technology, 2008, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.
com/abstract¼101.3984.
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legislation to protect personal information and the many
facets of personal life can be critical in this regard. The laws
respecting personal privacy and protecting personal data
needs to be adapted to technological and social–political
changes that threaten the conditions necessary for an indi-
vidual to freely develop their personality.3.2. Three important changes27
The development of information technology can be described
chronologically along three aspects. Firstly, there is Moore’s
law. This describes the constant growth of the capacity of
computers, user terminals and the communication infra-
structure to which is added the seemingly limitless capacity of
computer analysis. Secondly, we have the Internet revolution,
which we can look at in three ways: the convergence of the
network around a single interoperable platform, the appear-
ance of the ‘Semantic Web’ and Web 2.0 and lastly, the
changes in identification and authentication techniques.
Thirdly, is a still more profound change, the emergence of
ambient intelligence that takes technology and the network
and puts that technology into our everyday life, the things
around us, the places we go, the body we inhabit.3.3. Two induced tendencies
These technological changes have created two important
tendencies as regards our use of the web. The first underlines
the privatisation of cyberspace where private corporations
establish the technical norms but, equally, where access is
only possible to those who have the necessary knowledge, and
raising thus the question of access to the needed knowledge.
The second observation concerns the global aspect of our
actions on the Internet, and the way in which the functioning
of our web access points and web infrastructure shape our
behaviour and interactions. With this second point we see
that service providers and computer manufacturers have
some responsibility as concerns our communication envi-
ronment and require our consideration if we wish to introduce
or import into data protection legislation certain principles of
environmental law.2826 So Judge POSNER justifies the multiple legislative attempts to
Privacy by the necessity of the fight against terrorists and the
imperatives of the public security (E.A. POSNER and A. VER-
MEULE, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty and the Courts, Oxford
University Press, 2007).
27 More on these evolutions might be found in Y. POULLET (with
the cooperation of J.M. DINANT), ‘‘The Internet and private Life in
Europe: Risks and aspirations’’, in A.T. KENYON and M.
RICHARDSON (eds), New dimensions in Privacy law, International and
Comparative Perspectives, Cambridge Univ. Press, p. 60 and ff.
28 The interest to introduce the principle of the environmental
law into the Internet law is developed infra, no. 5.2.1.4. Three major changes29
4.1. Improvements in the ability to store data, the raw
power of calculation and transmission, as well as the user
terminals themselves
4.1.1. Moore’s law
The first evolution concerns storage media. It is usual on that
point to quote Moore’s law, which states that memory
capacity will double every 18 months [1000 times improve-
ment in 15 years], while at the same time, cost for this
improved capacity is reduced by 50%. In a study done for the
Council of Europe,30 regarding the problems associated with
data protection we see: ‘‘[it] has become and will continue to
be easier and easier to record the life of every individual on the
planet (our own and that of others.)’’.
For example, we could look at the feasibility of recording every
telephone call from Europe to the entire world. No small task as it
would mean stocking the equivalent of 15 billion minutes of
telephoneconversationonanannualbasis.31 Ifwerealizethatwe
need approximately 10,000 bits per second to digitalize the voice,
that we can compress the information by a factor of two (which is
typical),weseethatweneedsomething likefiveterabytestostore
24 h of telephone traffic, easily feasible today with a system of
disk arrays where each disk can store around 400 GB.
Furthermore, the average volume of these hundreds of
thousands of simultaneous telephone communications equals
approximately 0.5 GB per second, and can be carried easily on
a single optical fibre the thickness of a human hair. Put another
way it is entirely possible to have ALL telephone communica-
tions pass through a single tube of glass a few microns across.
At present, we find systems like the old ‘‘Walkman’’ but
which are perfectly capable of recording the equivalent of
several hundred CDs in MP3 format. Digital cameras today
allow us to record hundreds even thousands of photos,
cameras in the past were limited to 36 shots. This increase in
storage capacity, the capacity of calculation and transmission
simply is demonstrated each time Google works scanning in
just a few seconds more than 500,000 sites in the world to
answer your request.
4.1.2. The users’ terminals: from multifunction to
miniaturisation
A second evolution can be noted in user terminals. This
change is on several fronts. Of course technical and func-
tional, but it also concerns their regulation.29 For a more complete view on these trends, see Y. POULLET, A.
ROUVROY, ‘‘Introductory Remarks, General report’’, European
Conference on Ethics and human rights in a Information Society,
Conference organized by UNESCO and Council of Europe, Stras-
bourg, 13–14 Sept., 2007 available at the UNESCO website.
30 Y. POULLET and J.M. DINANT, «Self-determination at Internet era.
Some reflections on the Convention 108 regarding the future work of the
Consultative Committee (T-PD)», Report available on the Council of
Europe website: http://www.coe.int.
31 The figures have been calculated on the basis of an extrapo-
lation of figures given by the International Telecommunication
Union as regards the year 1999 (see: http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/
statistics/atglance/Eurostat 2001.pdf).
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paper referred to as ‘‘user terminal’’) is defined in the European
Directive on telecommunications terminal equipment32 as ‘‘a
product enabling communication or a relevant component
thereof which is intended to be connected directly or indirectly
by any means whatsoever to interfaces of public telecommuni-
cations networks (that is to say, telecommunications networks
used wholly or partly for the provision of publicly available
telecommunications services)’’. This broad definition includes
not only personal computers, or other typical user terminals
such as telephones (mobile or fixed), faxes, but equally RFID,33
chip cards, and in the future, ‘‘intelligent molecules’’34 implan-
ted in people themselves.
What is interesting about the RFID, whose use is presently
growing exponentially, is as much the miniaturisation, as the
fact that it sticks to and associates the owner with an object32 European Parliament and Council Directive 1999/5/EC of
March 9 1999, on radio equipment and telecommunications
terminal equipment and the mutual recognition of their confor-
mity, O.J., l 091, 4 April, 1999, p. 10 and ff.
33 We in fact distinguish three types of RFIDs or tags and this
according to the passivity or not of the device installed:
- active tags are equipped with an autonomous energy source (a
battery or solar collector) and with a chip; they are only able to
signal their presence and/or establish more elaborate dia-
logues with reading devices which are designed to receive the
radio signals emitted by a tag; the cost of these tags is high
($20) even if their cost is constantly going down. Their life-
span is limited by the use of a battery;
- semi-passive tags do not establish communication with the
reader but are nevertheless equipped with batteries which
make it possible for the chip to store elements of a physical
type, like temperature, pressure,. This type of tag is thus in
general coupled with physical sensors, which are small
wireless detectors useful in controlling environmental factors
(for example controlling energy consumption). Their cost can
range from $10 to 100 a piece;
- passive tags, which are the most widespread, are stimulated by
electromagnetic induction (in fact by the wave emitted by the
‘‘forward Channel’’ reader) and in return emit a fixed alphanu-
merical sequence via well-defined radio frequencies (‘‘back-
ward Channel’’). Since these tags do not contain batteries, their
lifespan is unlimited. Their cost is minimal (from 20 cents to
a few dollars); the cost being based on the sophistication of the
chip (the memory size or the capacity for encoding).
34 .through nanotechnologies or RFID tags. As regards health
care, we also witness the implanting of radio-tags in humans (the
Company ‘Applied Digital Solutions’ and its Verichip). These
solutions can be very useful for certain categories of patients at
risk (Alzheimer’s, cardiovascular or diabetes sufferers), insofar as
one can insert medical data considered urgent into the chip, thus
allowing the problems which this emergency data reveals to be
read off the chip remotely and, thus, intervention as needed for
a patient unable to express himself. The recent report of the
European Group on the Ethics and Technology already quoted
accordingly describes many applications whose interest is
obvious. Thus, an implant in the body of a patient with a chronic
disease like diabetes makes it possible to remotely control via the
telephone the state of the diabetic patient and even, within the
context of an interactive RFID, to send him the impulses neces-
sary for re-establishment of a compromised situation.and indirectly the behaviour of its owner. This raises the
question of whether legislation on the protection of ‘‘identi-
fiable’’ personal data is applicable.35
In addition to the point raised above, two others of interest
can be raised relative to user terminals. Firstly, concerning the
nature of the equipment, the technology has moved from
electromechanical to programmable electronics. In other
words, the operation of the user terminal is not dictated by the
user,36 but by the manufacturer of the terminal or by a third
party that has inserted programs in the terminal to operate it
from a distance (for example spyware or updates for programs
in the computer system).37 In fact, the user of the terminal
only partially controls the computer; he does not initiate all
the changes.
This lack of control by the user reflects a similar loss of
control by the state in terms of control of production norms
for these user terminals. Where previously the functioning
and the design of the old ‘‘voice telephony apparatus’’ were
entirely regulated, this is no longer the case as concerns the35 The particularity of RFIDs consists in the fact that they
introduce a bond between an object and information relative to
that object (its temperature, its location, etc.); that object may be
the human body. Surely, and this is the point, can one start from
there and conclude to information relating to the owner of the
object or a chip bearer and initiate certain medical treatments,
advertising campaigns, etc., aimed at him? And yet, it is not
necessary to know his identity or even seek it. What is essential is
that that subject X, an RFID bearer, is at such a place, has made
such a purchase, and has a valid ticket. In such cases, can one
speak about data of a personal nature, within the meaning of
article 2 a) of directive 1995/46/EC? The concept of identity is at
the heart of this type of data’s definition. No doubt, this definition
is broad in that, as we are reminded by the Article 29 Working
party in connection with cookies (Working Paper 4/2007 on the
concept of personal data, WP no. 136 (June 20, 2007)) or RFIDs
((Working paper 5/2005 on questions of data protection posed by
RFID technology, WP no. 105 (January 19, 2005), both texts are
available on the Commission site: http://www.ec.europa.eu/
justice_home/fsj/privacy)). The Working Party refers to
preamble 26, ‘identifiability’ is conceived in terms of ‘‘all the
means liable, reasonably, to be set up, either by the data
processor, or by another person, to identify the aforementioned
person’’. And since, as the group itself recognizes, the very
breadth of this approach to the concept of data of a personal
nature prevents its covering every case, it remains theoretical, for
example, if those using the data provided by cookies or RFIDs
don’t seek to identify the person concerned but simply to profile
a computer owner so as to decide on certain actions in his regard.
36 About the opacity of the present functioning of our terminal
equipments and the absolute need to ensure its transparent
functioning by default, see on this criterion, see the reflections of
Y. POULLET and J.M. DINANT in ‘‘Informational Self-determination in
the Internet Era’’, Report on the Application of Data Protection
Principles to Worldwide Telecommunications Networks,
Consultative Committee of the Convention for the protection of
individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data,
Strasbourg 12/13/2004, T-PD (2004) 04 final, available online on
the Council of Europe’s website.
37 About these intrusive software, read http://www.clubic.com/
actualite-21463-phishing-et-spyware-les-menaces-pesantes-de-
2005.html. Let us recall that Art. 5.3 of the European Directive
2002/58/EC on e-privacy forbids these intrusion into the terminal
equipment without the consent of its user.
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broadly the terminal equipment’s development.38
4.1.3. Multifunctional user terminals and the
convergence of networks
A second characteristic is the ‘‘multifunctionality’’ available
in most user terminals (personal computers of course but also
3G cell phones). The traditional division between media based
on their function (telephone for voice; television for image and
sound, etc.) is disappearing as all content is now digitalised39
and with user terminals having multiple uses. This in turn
allows the providers of service, or anyone involved in the
supply, to propose certain sites, to use cross-platform formats
of previously separate functions (so that on the same terminal
equipment we use voice communications services, we listen
to the radio, we send e-mails, we watch television,.).4.2. Internet evolution
4.2.1. Network convergence and worldwide participation
The Internet revolution that we are all watching has several
interesting aspects. We often insist on the global aspect of the
interchange between people, without leaving our chair,
enabling us to reach the four corners of the earth. The
convergence of all the networks presently is discussed and
new models of fourth generation interactive television are in
course of implementation, leading to the final convergence of
all networks/media/formats and the handling of our diverse
communications that until now were carried through sepa-
rate infrastructures.
4.2.2. The Semantic Web
Our reflections do not stop here. In order to offer a higher level
of interoperability, a dialogue between different contents not
even in the same format, and the possibility to understand
messages sent, the web has become semantic.40 Computers
are creating metadata, that is, they are associating informa-
tion that they store or send with this metadata to allow easier
access for people or computers to access or analyse the
information from a distance. Automated analysis of e-mail
content is a good example of this new possibility. With this
new ‘‘intelligence’’, information systems are capable of
analyzing the content of various databases and do not require38 About the importance of these private standardisation bodies
as W3C or IETF, read P. TRUDEL et al., Droit du cyberspace, Mon-
tréal, Themis, 1997, Book 3 and the critiques addressed to that
privatisation, M.A. FROOMKIN, «Habermas@discourse.net:
Towards a critical theory of Cyberspace», 116 Harvard Law Rev.,
1996, p. 800 and ff.
39 So the standards JPEG for pictures, EFR for the voice, MPEG for
moving images.
40 On the future Semantic Web, see M. RUNDLE, Ethical implica-
tions of emerging technologies in the Information Society, UNESCO
Publications, 2006. ‘‘The Semantic Web is an evolving extension of
the World Wide Web in which the semantics of information and
services on the web are defined, making it possible for the web to
understand and satisfy the requests of people and machines to
use the web content. It derives from World Wide Web Consor-
tium director Sir Tim Berners-Lee’s vision of the Web as
a universal medium for data, information, and knowledge
exchange’’ (http://en.wikipedia.org).that the data has a predefined internal structure. We cannot
overemphasize that the creation of these metadata markers,
which allow us to find information through filters, keywords
and conceptualisation, is inherent to the Semantic Web and
has not been set in motion or even consciously used by the
person we call the user, but rather is the result of automated
operations carried out by the computer.
4.2.3. Web 2.0
Web 2.0 refers to a large variety of applications characterised
by user participation in the creation and functioning of online
sites. We are referring here to social networking sites, or
encyclopaedias like ‘Wikipedia’ and content sharing sites like
‘YouTube’ or ‘Dailymotion’. These kinds of uses raise new
questions as regards the protection of personal data.41 This is
so, first, because these sites concern sometimes intimate
details that are supplied willingly and actively by the users:
emotions, the group of friends, and the events in their lives or
the lives of others, their health; and second, because the
information is about them and those close to them. Here we
can see the web user in two roles that in the past were sepa-
rate: from one site as data subject – the subject of the personal
content posted on the Internet – and from the other site as
data processor since web user might also be the generator of
personal data posted on the website.
The program allows the service provider, but also third
parties, firstly, to analyse the content and information placed
on the site by the user, secondly, apart from this data and the
multiple uses generated by this latter to profile him or her and
thirdly to take advantage of the so-acquired knowledge
including use outside of its original context.42 Therefore,
employers might well analyse available social networking
material when evaluating a candidate for a particular job. We
need to keep in mind that the web ‘‘remembers’’ events pos-
ted even only temporarily. Finally, it is troubling to see how
‘‘private’’ and ‘‘public’’ spheres are intermingled on these
sites.4.3. Methods of identification and authentication
4.3.1. Digital identities: why?
Another remarkable evolution on the Internet has come
from the availability and use of identification and authenti-
cation methods of users on the net. These methods allow
users to identify and to be identified or, with identity
management systems, to allow access to informational
resources or services. In addition, beyond this, it is possible
to identify users with certainty and thereby add or deduce
new information about them drawing on sources from all41 About these issues, read notably, G. GONZALES FUSTER et S.
GUTWIRTH, ‘‘Privacy 2.0?’’ RDTI, 2008, special issue, Web 2.0, pp.
351–379. See also the report and the recommendations of the
International Working Group on data Protection in Telecommu-
nications: Report and Guidance on Privacy in Social Network Services,
‘Rome Memorandum’, 43rd meeting, Roma, March 2008.
42 These diverse ‘‘data aggregations’’ and the privacy threats
they generate are described by the HOGBEN report (HOGBEN (ed.),
Security Issues and Recommendations for Online Social Networks,
ENISA, Position Paper no. 1, Heraklion, Greece, Oct. 2007, p. 3 and
ff.).
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‘‘digital identities’’ are a kind of metadata that allow the
cross-referencing of the individual’s information available
on different databases; in other words as matching identi-
fiers. We need to underline the dangers of using the same
digital identity in several areas of our online life. It is clear
that the more often the same identification method or the
same access key is used in different databases, the more
easily our identity can be cross-referenced. We know for
example that in certain countries, the national registration
number is stored in all the governmental databases. This
increases the possibility of cross-referencing the information
and thus enhances the power of the state as regards the
citizen. From that point of view, these matching identifiers
might be considered as quite sensitive data even if they are
not always linked with an identified or identifiable individual
but with an object.44 Overall, the sharing of this identifying
data by those who collect it raises the question of how to
handle correctly the data within the given context. We will
come back to this point later when envisaging the principles
of proportionality of the processing and of its content.45
4.3.2. Digital identities: how?
Finally, let us examine more closely the evolution of the nature
of these digital identities. The primary digital identifiers are
directly connected to the person, name, address, mobile phone
number, passwords or electronic signatures; the secondary
identifiers are indirect but are based on known information
concerning the individual. ‘‘Cookies’’, IP addresses or RFID tag
numbers, while not necessarily known to the individual, are
associated with a site or object with which the person is con-
nected, and these ID techniques are mastered and understood
by the people or businesses that place them there. With
biometric identification technology (iris, fingerprints, voice)
identity and identifiability are reduced from a flesh and blood
reality to just so much data. Here we note a certain evolution, as
biometric information can concern an exterior physical trait or
look more deeply at the genetic level of the individual. In the
latter case, this genetic information can be used to follow the
individual from cradle to grave. Contrary to other identification43 On that point, M. RUNDLE, ‘‘International Personal Data
Protection and Digital Identity Management Tools’’, Paper pre-
sented at the Identity Mashup Conference (Harvard Law School,
20 June 2006), available at the SSRN paper collection: http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract or at the Berkman Center for Internet
and Society Research Publication Series website (Research
publication no. 2006, June 2006-06) available at: http://cyber.law.
harvard.edu/publications. From the same author, M.C. RUNDLE
et P. TREVITHICK, ‘‘Interoperability in the new Digital Identity
Infrastructure’’ (Feb. 13, 2007), paper published at Social Science
Research Network, available on the website: http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract._id¼962701.
44 On that point, read J.M. DINANT, ‘‘The concepts of Identity
and Identifiability: Both a legal and technical deadlock for pro-
tecting human beings in the information society?’’, in Reinventing
Data Protection, S. GUTWIRTH, Y. POULLET et al. (eds.), Dordrecht,
The Netherlands, Springer Verlag, 2008 (to be published in Feb.
2009).
45 On that issue, notably C. PARKER & J. BRAITHWAITE. Regula-
tion. In P. CANE & M. TUSHNET (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Legal
Studies. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 119 and ff.and identifiability data, this particular data cannot be
controlled or erased by the person concerned.46
4.4. Ambient intelligence: when and where the virtual
world and the physical world meet
4.4.1. Real joining virtual connections: from GPS to RFID
Before looking any further at possible connections between
the virtual and real, we must pinpoint the impact of Global
Positioning Systems (GPS). GPS assist the individuals wher-
ever they may be (routing services, but also services to inform
about the local environment, connected through a mobile
phone). These systems permit to trace the movements of the
object to which they are associated. The GSM technologies
through more and more sophisticated design and their
evolving generations also ensure the geographical follow-up
of their users. These technologies connected with RFID
readers or tags permit association of an individual to a specific
object and therefore to send an appropriate message in the
context of online ‘‘behavioural advertising’’. For instance, it
will be possible to propose to the mobile user a short
presentation of the movie presented at the cinema when he
stops just in front of an RFID equipped affix presenting the
film.47 A reader located into the mobile will detect the pres-
ence of the affix and send a message to a marketing company
that will send the appropriate images.
The ambient intelligence network allows many possibili-
ties for connecting the real and virtual worlds. Their objective
is to allow direct interaction between the person and their
environment. This artificial intelligence, which present-day
ICT allows, along with easy access to cyberspace, is now
present in things, places, even our own bodies. According to
the prophetic vision of the computer engineer Weiser,48 the
visible aspect of the technology disappears and it becomes
simply ‘‘normal’’ i.e. totally integrated into our daily life.
These technologies of ambient intelligence owe their devel-
opment to the extreme miniaturisation of the user terminals
(for example RFID, terminals the size of a grain of rice and
various types of nanotechnology still in the early stages of
development connected through their receptors and the
Internet to various information systems). Possible applica-
tions are many and allow us, for example, to follow the
movements of a consumer in the supermarket and permit
a ‘‘dialogue’’ between the consumer’s chip and that in the
purchases to automatically add up the total cost. These
embedded chips also allow us to read passports from46 About the very specific peculiarity of biometric data and the
risks linked with their uses, read C. PRIENS, ‘‘Biometric tech-
nology Law. Making your body identify for us: legal implications
of biometric technologies’’, [1998] 14 CLSR 159 and ff. A. CAV-
OUKIAN and A. STOIANOV, Biometric Encryption: A pos-
itive-Sum. Technology that achieves strong authentication,
Security and Privacy, Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario,
March 2007.
47 See other examples and reflections in N. KING, ‘‘Direct
Marketing, Mobile Phone and Consumer Privacy: Ensuring
Adequate Disclosure and Consent Mechanisms for Emerging
Mobile Advertising Practices’’, 60 Fed. Communications Law Journal,
2008, pp. 231–325.
48 M. WEISER, ‘‘The Computer for the 21st Century’’, Scientific
American, 1991, Vol. 265, no. 3, pp. 66–75.
52 On that experience, see: http://www.baja.nl.
53 Within the framework of employment relationships, the
‘implanted’ chip or simply one ‘carried by the employee’ will
make it possible for the employer to note his hours of arrival, to
control his moving about or even detect any abnormalities. In the
insurance sector, the application of RFID technology may induce
radical transformations: whereas the amount of insurance
premiums is currently fixed at the time of the contract signature,
according to the limited information available to the insurer at
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longer have in our ‘‘intelligent fridges’’, or have our television
sense our arrival and send our favourite series to the screen of
the computer in the office. The possibilities are truly endless
and encourage us to continue the exploration of ambient
intelligence (see below).
4.4.2. Ubiquitous computing
We can talk about ‘‘ubiquitous’’ computing in as much as the
terminals can be placed anywhere and note everything we do
in our daily lives, our movements, our hesitations, or what we
choose to eat. Next, this is a technology that is largely invisible
in two ways (‘Calm Technology’); it operates in a largely
hidden way (we do not know what information is collected,
when or for whom), but also, as a natural extension of an
activity or movement (a door opens and the computer comes
on) assisting us in our choice of activities. Finally, this tech-
nology learns. These systems often adapt their operation
based on feedback from their use.49 For instance, in a big
supermarket, the system will record our purchases and
improve our profile over time to send us specifically targeted
publicity.
Consequently, ambient intelligence technologies50 tend to
associate the virtual and real worlds. In the space created in
the network where there is dialogue between objects, and
between objects and people, this is in the real world, the
territory held by ICT. At the heart of this network, human
beings can become themselves a ‘‘thing’’, simply an
embedded chip reacting to other embedded chips.51 Finally,
we can raise question of the medical uses of RFID technology.
Implanted in the body, they can monitor functioning from
a distance or even correct the functioning, for example
relieving stress or stimulating memory.49 ‘‘Humans will, in an Ambient Intelligent Environment, be
surrounded by intelligent interfaces supported by computing and
networking technology that is embedded in everyday objects
such as furniture, clothes, vehicles, road and smart materials –
even particles of decorative substances like paint. AmI implies
a seamless environment of computing advanced networking
technology and specific interfaces. This environment should be
aware of the specific characteristics of human presence and
personalities; adapt to the needs of the user; be capable of
responding intelligently to spoken or gestured indications of
desire; and even result in systems that are capable of engaging in
intelligent dialogue. AmI should be relaxing and enjoyable for the
citizen, and not involve a steep learning curve.’’ (IST Advisory
Group’s Report, ‘‘Ambient intelligence: from vision to reality. For
participation in Society and Business’’, 2003 ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.
eu/pub/ist/docs/istag).
50 The term was used for the first time in 1999 by the Advisory
Group of the IST Program of the European Union (the ISTAG) in its
report on the future of technologies. On all of this, cf. J. AHOLA,
‘‘Ambient Intelligence’’, ERCIM News, 2001, n# 47, available on the
site: www.ercim.org/publications/Ercim_News/enw47. Cf. also
the expression of ‘‘Ubiquitous Computing’’ launched in 1991 by
M. WEISER, ‘‘The Computer for the 21st Century’’, Scientific
American, 265 (3), p. 66–75.
51 Read, A. ROUVROY, Privacy, Data Protection, and the
Unprecedented Challenges of Ambient Intelligence, in Studies in
Ethics, Law, and Technology, 2008, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.
com/abstract¼101.3984.4.4.3. The reasons for the success of ambient
intelligence technologies
50% of the ‘‘regulars’’ at BAJA Club,52 a firm managing dancing
and gaming clubs situated in Holland and Spain, agreed to
have an RFID chip implanted in their body. When journalist
asked them why they did this, they replied that this made it
easier for them as they were instantly recognized as good
clients and could immediately enter the casino. They also said
that they avoided the risk of having their wallet stolen since
all their spending was deducted directly from their credit card.
With this example, and there are many others, it is clearly
illustrated how the logic of security and efficiency (to gain
time and money) explain why these systems are so success-
ful.53 It is this same RFID chip that the American government
intends to implant in every American citizen so that in the
case of accident or if a person is unconscious, they can be
identified and obtain the medical file of the person concerned.
Along the same lines, there was a strong emotional reaction in
Belgium when it was discovered that RFID chips were
implanted in the passports ‘‘for security reasons’’, and a very
great reluctance, even on the part of the manufacturers, for
the same passport project proposed by the American
government.54that time, the application of RFID technology would make it
possible to vary the amount of the premiums charged over time
depending on the behaviour of the policyholder. Auto insurance
premiums, for example, would thus become dependent on
criteria such as the number of kilometres travelled, average
speed, etc. The informational asymmetry between the insurer
and the policyholder would be appreciably reduced and, as the
evaluation of the risk became finer, one would witness the
increasing individualization of risk evaluation, which, pushed to
its ultimate end, would in fact mean the end of insurance. As
François Ewald (F. EWALD (1991) Insurance and Risk in G. BUTCH-
ELL, C. GORDON, P. MILLER (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in
Governmentality, Burchell, University of Chicago Press, 1991)
explains, the concept of individual risk contradicts the traditional
principle whereby, in the insurance field at least, a risk is always
collective, even if its materialization is individual.
54 About these debates, see the conclusions published by the
Smart Card Alliance (November, 3 2006), available on the
website: http://www.smartcardalliance.org/pages/publications-
whti-passport-card) regarding the use of RFID technology in
the passports and the possibility of their at distance reading: ‘‘The
vicinity read Rfid Technology proposed for the passport card, in combination
with its weak cryptographic protection, will feed citizen distrust due to the
undeniable observation by some technologies that the citizen’s unique
reference number could be obtained and used to track the citizen whenever
the card is outside of its protective sleeve. This raises serious privacy
concerns that will have to be overcome if the program is to be embraced by
Americans’’. In the same line, the Budapest memorandum on the
MRTD (Machine Readable Travel Document) available on the FIDIS
(European Research Project FP 6) website: http://www.fidis.net/
press-events/press-releases/declaration-de-budapest.
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zations and citizens, calls for ever more efficient control,
surveillance and alarm systems.55 Economic profitability, in
the broadest sense, and efficiency become additional justifi-
cations, where the concerns of the public services and
companies on the one hand, meet the interests of consumers
and citizens on the other, interests carefully presented by
those same public services and companies.5. Two important trends
5.1. The privatisation of cyberspace
5.1.1. The meaning of the idea
Here we would like to indicate that many of the norms used in
cyberspace and the operation of the network (IP addresses,
web protocols, etc.) are outside the control of public authori-
ties whether they are national, regional or international. The
control of the Internet is private. Primarily, the Internet
functioning and rare resources are controlled by private
international organizations such as W3C (World Wide Web
Consortium), IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) and ICANN56
and, through discussions between private organizations and
not negotiations between states.
Privatisation of cyberspace has another significance
when we see the access to cyberspace, as much for those
using it as for those providing the content, is constrained by
certain actors in the field: ISPs, particular websites and
search engines. They can orient our search for information,
our movements on the net and make us accept ‘their’ rules;
rules such as accepting publicity and disclosing our iden-
tity, etc. These companies are often the same people that
install filters, limits and procedures to remove content and
thus become the self-proclaimed censors of the public
spaces on the Internet.57 In the same sense, we know how
people have contested certain types of DRM systems
(Digital Rights Management)58 when the techniques went
much further than anything required by the logic of pro-
tecting intellectual rights. Cases exist where restraint was
so excessive as to be detrimental to the basic freedom of
others or inhibited access of everyone to certain essential
material.55 Read notably D. LYON, «Surveillance Society, Understanding
Visibility, Mobility and the Phonetic Fix», in Surveillance and
Society, Vol. 1 (1), p. 1 et seq., 2002.
56 See supra, 4.1.3, Footnote 38.
57 D. NUNZIATE, ‘‘The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace’’,
Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 2005, p. 1115 and ff.
58 These measures reinforced by their legal enactment
contribute to limit a priori the access to certain works including
despite legal exceptions (DRM) or/and acknowledge the presence
of the work in any of its fragment without any discussion about
the subsistence of the conditions of the legal protection in all
these fragments (Tattooing). They permit a reinforcement of the
control of any reuse of each element of the work. On the rela-
tionships between IPR and Data Protection, read L. BYGRAEVE,
‘‘Digital Rights Management and Privacy: Legal Aspects in the
European Union’’, in E. Becker et al., Digital Rights Management:
Technological, Economic, Legal and Political Aspects (Heidelberg:
Springer Verlag, 2003, pp. 418–444).And finally, we can see that surveillance technologies,
applied more and more in public spaces (shopping malls,
department stores, discotheques, etc.), are in fact privatizing
space that until now has been for all of us anonymous, and in
addition to watching our every move, techniques work to
exclude certain segments of the population, as has been seen
in sociological studies.59
5.2. The global consequences of local actions and
decisions
5.2.1. The information society and its regulation: parallels to
environmental regulation
Among those active on the net, we need to particularly
examine those who offer services based on these technolo-
gies. The way these products and services are built can have
important repercussions for the whole planet. This is partic-
ularly true when the economic power of the companies con-
cerned can decide the conditions of who accesses or publishes
what information in huge areas of the world. It must be noted
in particular that the Internet offers a tenfold increase as
concerns the impact of certain press organizations.
The Internet can also increase by tenfold the influence of
an individual, when directly or indirectly, consciously or
unconsciously, with a single message posted on the Internet,
a single comment in his blog, he destroys the reputation of
another person, passes on a virus, sends or uses child
pornography and thereby encourages human degradation and
slavery. If all these actions might be perpetrated from home,
they can have terrible consequences on the other side the
world. The Internet can give our acts, even those that are
entirely personal, enormous global impact with no particular
effort on our part. This then raises questions regarding indi-
vidual and collective responsibility. It may be useful to look at
it as an information ecosystem, in a similar way as problems
of environmental degradation encourage us to think of our
individual responsibilities in worldwide terms. The principles
of sustainable development and especially those concerning
shared risks and the principle of precaution could be equally
useful to us in regulating the Internet as they are to the field of
bioethics, but until now, there has been no comparable
consensus.606. Some ideas and advice to assure data
protection in our information society
6.1. Plan of the third section: three caveats
The characteristics of these new technologies, the uses we
make of them and the way they are applied lead us to re-59 A. WAKEFIELD, «The public surveillance Functions of Private
Security», Surveillance and Society, 2005, 2 (4).
60 About the need to apply in the Internet regulation the same
principles than those asserted in the environmental regulation,
read Y. POULLET et A. ROUVROY, «Le droit à l’autodétermination
informationnelle et la valeur du développement personnel – Une
réévaluation de l’importance de la vie privée pour la démocratie»,
in L’état de droit virtuel, Proceedings of the Colloquium organized
by L.H. Wilson Chair at Montreal, October 2007.
61 Working paper on the questions of data protection posed by RFID
technology, January 19, 2005, WP No. 105 available on the European
Commission website: http://www.ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/
privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp105_fr.pdf.
62 As asserted by Anne Cavioukan, DPA Commissioner from
Ontario (Canada) in its introductory remarks to the Privacy
Guidelines for RFID Information Systems available on the web-
site: http://www.ipc.on.ca: ‘‘Privacy and Security must be built in
from the Outset – at the design Stage’’.
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While it may shock some lawyers, who are too often given
exclusive responsibility to protect data, there are three
important caveats they must bear in mind.
First, stop acting like a lawyer. When looking at new
developments that allow new possibilities, do not react
legalistically, rather look at the social impact and the trans-
formation of human relations created by these technologies.
Second, understand that the law is not the only solution to the
risks created by this new technology: ‘If technology created
the problem, technology can solve the problem’. The law can
allow technology to solve its own problems. Third, keep in
mind two keywords from the legislation on data protection
‘proportionality’ and ‘transparency’. Now, these concepts
need to be fully understood and applied in the contemporary
world.
The three points raised above require further elaboration.
6.2. ‘‘Viva data protection rights’’ an idea with limits
6.2.1. A few examples
Do not limit yourself to the legalistic considerations; look at
the wider picture, how information technology modifies our
way of living. It is only by looking at the changes and uses of
these technologies, often very positive, though occasionally
with some negative aspects, that we can eventually find an
appropriate legal solution in combination, or not, with other
regulatory solutions.
Three examples can illustrate the point. The first concerns
uses brought in for electronic government. We know that the
use of ICT in government departments increases the level of
communications between departments. In one case, it is to
verify a certain piece of information about a citizen, in
another, to see if the regulations have been followed, or to
automatically check who is eligible for benefits. While these
internal communication channels are laudable, as much for
the efficiency of the bureaucracy as for the rights respected
and service rendered to the citizen, a radical transformation of
the relationship between the citizen and the state is taking
place. The state is no longer a local office, but rather, a whole
network. A citizen who asks for a building permit confronts
faceless administration collecting information from various
necessary sources, automatically weighing the different
factors and rendering a verdict. The only identity a citizen has
for the state administration is their electronic identity and pin
code, their national identification number. In the area of social
benefits, the decision in any given case is based entirely on
whether or not specific criteria are met. No consideration is
given to the person, their difficulties or the situation they may
find themselves in. The citizen is no longer a person, simply
a number, and a number in ‘Big Brother’s machine’.
The second example leads us to question the multiplica-
tion of cooperative networks within various industries. For
instance, the insurance industry has set up a database to fight
against the risks of fraudsters, defaulters and those that make
frequent claims. The risk of this kind of cooperative venture is
the fear that certain people will be ‘blacklisted’ and thus
excluded from services that are essential in our society. In
effect, what can someone do if they are on the blacklist, need
a car for their work and cannot get car insurance?The last example comes from a recent event related in the
local newspaper. A school worked out a system that instan-
taneously recognized students enrolled in the school by
placing an RFID chip in the school bag of each student. Placing
such a chip in this way raises many questions that, while not
being judicial, are essential to consider. We can well imagine
how a child between 5 and 10 years old might resent the
school if he was locked out of school simply because his
mother had bought a new school bag the day before. What will
the childcare worker think when their ‘productivity’, that
is, the number of children present, is automatically controlled
by the system?
6.2.2. A ‘Technology Assessment’ approach
These three examples show the interest of having a wider
‘Technology Assessment’ approach to examine the full social
consequences of innovation, rather than by narrowly defined
technological efficiency. This analysis allows a clearer deter-
mination of what is at stake and the risks involved when
analyzing data protection procedures. It is only in as much as
we have weighed the above considerations that we can
properly appreciate the legitimacy of the innovations and
their eventual impact on our freedoms.6.3. While technology offers risk, it can also offer
solutions
6.3.1. The RFID case
The recent European debate regarding RFID chips leads to
certain conclusions regarding the responsibilities of terminal
manufacturers and suppliers of RFID systems. These conclu-
sions concern the infrastructures of the collection and trans-
mission systems, the data generated by the RFID terminals,
the databases themselves and the analysis on which the
ongoing decisions are based. It was essential that the Euro-
pean debate enlarge the basic protection of data to include the
infrastructures and terminals. How can the data be properly
protected if the technical solutions do not take into account
present-day constraints and transpose them efficiently into
regulation? For instance to look at the case of RFID again, do
we agree with the Article 29 Working Party61 that a person
carrying a chip should be able to deactivate it easily and that
transmissions should be protected cryptographically? This
approach called ‘Privacy by Design’62 is based on some early
thinking in the area first framed in French law in 1978:
Information technology should be at the service of every citizen.
Its development shall take place in the context of international co-
operation. It shall not violate human identity, human rights,
privacy, or individual or public liberties.
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tently confirmed the principle that the responsibility for pro-
tecting the data of any users lies with the suppliers of terminal
equipment and those creating the infrastructures. They are
responsible for the risk.
6.3.2. Beyond the law, technology to the rescue
A second example of how technology can assist63 in protect-
ing personal liberties is the general demand that ‘Identity
Management’ systems allow control of access and data
transmission upstream and downstream in the data flux and
thus automatically assure the prescriptions and limits estab-
lished for the use of the personally identifiable data.
We can look at many such examples: for instance, the use
of cookies. These kinds of programs will flag their arrival,
block them, and offer the option to refuse or accept them.
They can also establish ‘no-robot’ parameters for a website
that prevents search engines from cataloguing the site auto-
matically. There is also a call for ‘Privacy Enhancing Tech-
nologies’,64 labelling systems and finally, collaboration
between public and private organizations to standardize
systems.65
In conclusion, we see that the law cannot attempt to solve
all the problems. As far as data protection is concerned, the
law must look to other methods of regulation, more partic-
ularly to the place of regulation through the technology
itself. As we noted in the conclusions of the MIAUCE
Report66:
Time has come for the law to also seek the help of technology to
ensure that the same instruments aimed at observing persons
and events (for purposes ranging from safety or security, to
marketing and entertainment; through technologies involving
observation and/or interaction and/or profiling) do not dispro-
portionately and illegitimately deny individuals’ adequate
protection of their fundamental rights and liberties.63 Like the famous EuroPrise labelling system developed jointly
by different Data Protection Authorities (www.european-privacy-
seal.eu). The privacy certificate aims to facilitate an increase of
market transparency for privacy relevant products and an
enlargement of the market for Privacy Enhancing Technologies
and finally an increase of trust in IT.
64 On that issue, read KPMG et al. (2004). Privacy-enhancing tech-
nologies: White paper for decision makers. Ministry of the Interior
and Kingdom Relations, The Netherlands. http://www.dutchdpa.
nl/downloads_overig/PET_whitebook.pdf. See also the EC
Communication to the E.P and the Council, «Promote Data Protec-
tion through the development of technologies increasing the Privacy
Protection», Com(2007) 208 final, Brussels 2.5.2007.
65 European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) & Information
Society Standardisation System (ISSS) (2002). Initiative on
privacy standardisation in Europe. Final report. Brussels: CEN/
ISSS. http://www.cen.eu/cenorm/sectors/sectors/isss/activity/
ipsefinalreportwebversion.pdf; see also, J.K. WINN, ‘‘Technical
Standards as Data Protection Regulation’’ in Reinventing Data
Protection, Proceedings of the Colloquium held at Brussels, Nov.
2007, Springer Verlag, 2009 (forthcoming).
66 M. CORNELIS, D. DARQUENNES, N. GRANDJEAN, C. LOBET-
MARIS, Y. POULLET, A. ROUVROY, Miauce, Deliverable D5.1.2.
Ethical, legal and social issues, available online on the MIAUCE
website: www.miauce.org.6.4. Two keywords to take seriously: proportionality and
transparency67
6.4.1. Proportionality of the analysis and content
If we can only remember two concepts as regards the legis-
lation on privacy, it needs to be these two. A close examina-
tion of their meaning reveals something new every day,
nuances regarding new applications or uses, and in general,
the characteristics of these new technologies.
First, let us examine proportionality. Proportionality covers
both the content and the analysis of the data. As far as the
analysis goes, we can think about the following questions.
 Is not there a way that is less intrusive to personal liberty to
reach the same objective(s)? For example, to resolve
a particular question, it is often simplest to use intelligent
cross-referencing of the trail left by users of today’s
communication technologies. However, these trails show
a lot of extraneous information; where the individuals are,
their relations with others, sites they have visited, and even
the discussions they have had.
 Is it necessary to force the cooperation of those involved? I.e.
the ISPs or other service providers; force them to retain and
store all the communications data, and establish methods
for the use of this data as a legal proof in a court of law?
 Profiling Internet users is easy by cross-referencing data
from various sources, but can calculating the credit risk of
a potential client or personalizing publicity offers justify the
profiling and the reductionist view of the individual?6.4.2. Some considerations and criticisms of ‘‘consent’’ as the
basis to legitimize data analysis
‘Consent’ is cited to justify all kinds of data analysis, but we
must establish clearly what this means. On the Internet
‘consent’ is an easy argument to make because the web is so
interactive and consent is given for piffling advantages, but
beyond this it is very difficult to refuse consent, in fact
refusing it is somehow ‘abnormal’, and thus pushes the user
to usually give it.
This approach is supported by the argument that ‘the right
to data protection’ is the right for the individual to decide what
data will be circulated. The person concerned by the data is the
best placed to decide68 whether or not the information should67 About the priority of these two key concepts in order to
understand Privacy legislations, read DE HERT and GUTWIRTH,
«Privacy, Data Protection and law enforcement. Opacity of the
individuals and Transparency of the power», in Privacy and the
Criminal Law, E. CLAES et al. (ed.), Interscientia, Antwerpe-
n–Oxford, 2006, p. 74.
68 The context of the Internet creates new possibilities for the
Internet users to express his or her consent. In a first version of P
3 P (Platform for Privacy Preferences), the Internet’s user had the
possibility to negotiate his or her privacy preferences against
financial advantages. This possibility has been discussed exten-
sively in the American literature, see P.M. SCHWARTZ, «Beyond
Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace, Filters, Privacy
Control and Fair Information Practices», Wisconsin Law Review,
2000, p. 749 et seq.; M. ROTENBERG, «What Larry Doesn’t Get the
Truth», Stan. Techn. L. Rev., 2001,1, disponible sur le site: http://
www.sth.Stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/01_STLR_1.
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legitimize any data analysis of information of a personal
nature. The argument that data of a personal nature can be
a ‘thing’ and might be alienated from the person concerned, or
used as a tradable commodity, is a disputable idea.69
For example, we can very well imagine that a medical file
belongs as much to the patient who ‘generated’ the informa-
tion, as to the treating physician. In the ‘Owner approach’,
personal data is considered as valuable merchandise that can
be the subject of negotiations and transactions with other
people through a series of licenses.70 The ‘Contractual
Approach’, which is very similar to the ‘Owner Approach’, is
centred on the agreement between the parties concerned
regarding use of the data. This does not really examine the
question of whether or not personal information can be
considered wholly as property, but does allow the parties
concerned to make promises with regard to data of a personal
nature and their possible uses. Schoeman71 adds:
[O]ne difficulty with regarding privacy as the claim or entitlement
to determine what information about one-self is to be available to
others is that it begs the question about the moral status of
privacy. It presumes privacy is something to be protected at the
discretion of the individual to whom the information relates.6.4.3. Proportionality and mainstream ideas
Proportionality goes on to examine the content of the analysis,
the information technologies themselves and especially, the
storage capacities and analysis of data, which make both the
collection of more informationand their constant transfer more
and more common. Is this mass of data necessary, adequate
and pertinent? The data protection managers must be attentive
not to retain unnecessary data and to assure that only autho-
rized users access data to which they have a legitimate right.
The need to reaffirm this principle of proportionality arises
the moment that the level of efficiency, whether in terms of69 As KANG & BUTNER observed: ‘But Economist, merely creating
property rights in personal data says nothing about to whom property is
initially assigned, correct? So let us say a citizen bought prodigious
amounts of St John’s herb from a vendor last Friday. Which of them
owns the ‘property’, that is the knowledge of the citizen’s purchase? And
what precisely would such ownership entail’ (J. KANG & B. BUCHNER,
‘Privacy in Atlantis’, 18 Harv. Journal Law &Techn., 2004, p. 9. This
article is written in the form of a Socratic discussion between
protagonists of different thesis and representatives of different
functions in a Society in order to build up a consensus about the
main principles of a future Privacy legislation). This assignation
might be justified following a market-based approach by the
greater efficiency of this solution.
70 As regards the similarities between this kind of contract and
the Licensing contracts about works protected by the Intellectual
Property, read P. SAMUELSON, ‘Privacy as Intellectual Property’,
52 Stanford Law Rev., 2000, p. 1125 and ff.; J. LITMAN, ‘ Information
Privacy/Information Property’, 52 Stanford Law Rev., 2000, p. 1250;
K. BASHO, ‘The Licensing of the personal information. Is that
a solution to Internet Privacy? ’, 88 California Law Rev., 2000, p.
1507.
71 F. SCHOEMAN, «Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions of the
Literature», in Philosophical Dimensions of the Privacy, F.D. SCHOE-
MAN (ed.), 1984, p. 3.economic efficiency or security, might substantially be
improved through advances in ICTs.
Thus, we see that public security but also the privacy of
organizations and citizens demands ever better systems of
control, surveillance and warning. Economic efficiency in the
widest sense and efficiency in general are further justifica-
tions. Here we can see the interests of government and orga-
nizations on the one hand, and the interests of consumers and
citizens in efficiency on the other; arguments put forward as
the justification for both states and organizations.
6.4.4. Transparency of data treatment and beyond
information systems
The second keyword is transparency in the treatment of
information. Of course, the data manager has the obligation to
inform those concerned of their right to access, correct or
signal their opposition to information contained about them,
as enshrined in data protection laws. However, how can we
not envision reinforcing these rights and obligations to re-
establish something like a level playing field and thereby
correct a growing information imbalance between those who
hold and transform the data and those referred to in that same
data. Is it not therefore necessary to require a clear exposition
of the pathways that the information follows, a map that
shows complex ebb and flow of the data?
6.4.5. Transparent terminals: technology to make things clear
Is it not necessary to oblige user terminals to operate in a clear
and transparent way? Much of what they do at present is
hidden and outside of the control of the users. We can also ask
ourselves if the equipment we use is adapted to that
requirement for clarity and transparency that permits the
user to have full control of the information sent and received.
In this way, the user should be able to know, through a clear
and easy method, the extent to which his computer chatters
on about him; what information is sent or received; who is
doing the sending and receiving and what use will be made of
this information. To this end, a data log would seem to be
a technique that is both appropriate and relatively easy to
implement.
Above and beyond the right of the user to be informed of
this flux of information arriving, we can ask ourselves what
right exists to authorize, or not, as the case may be, a third
party to enter our ‘virtual home’.727. Conclusions
7.1. Technology and privacy: Aesop’s tongue
It is clear that information technologies bring everyone the
possibility of liberation: the discovery of new worlds; to72 That comparison between the protection of terminal equip-
ment, considered as a virtual home, and the ‘physical’ home
envisaged by the article 8 of the European Convention can be
deduced from the article 5.3 of the European Directive on
e-privacy. This provision forbids any intrusion into the terminal
equipment through spyware, cookies and other pieces of infor-
mation or software except with the user’s consent or for very
specified legitimate reasons.
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communicate with others. It brings each person undeniable
advantages, whether they are economic (buying on the
Internet, fewer trips to the shops) or in terms of security (video
surveillance systems).
However, these technologies represent a risk to our liber-
ties at least as great as the advantages that they present, and
these risks are growing. Not only must we accept to be fol-
lowed constantly, to be reduced to a number, to accommodate
messages arriving constantly in our mailbox, on our screens,
even in our bodies; beyond this, we must give way to the
perception of personal information as merchandise, exposing
ourselves on the net through various sites and social
networks. Here especially, the added value brought by the
increasing recognition of the right to privacy as really the
defence of the human person, the person’s development and
dignity become absolutes; properly placing priorities of secu-
rity and economic efficiency in their place of only relative
importance.
‘Security first’ thinking automatically treats each indi-
vidual as a suspect and economic logic dictates that we will
all act based on rational self-interest. These ‘modern day’
maxims must be contested urgently, as by continually
seeing individuals in such a negative way, as is done in
particular through the technology of our information
society, we risk inducing the very behaviour that in fact
justifies the security and economic approaches above,73 but
at the price of losing our most precious capacities of our
freedom and our liberty.
If we can accept to question these public perceptions, we
can be assured that people reach their full potential, not only
in terms of personal liberty, but also their creative and polit-
ical potential, which is at present latent in our information
society. We see that the right to the protection of privacy is not
simply one among several other fundamental rights but the73 We totally agree with the European Data Protection Super-
visor (E.D.P.S.) when he asserts «a message such as: ‘‘No right to
privacy until life and security are guaranteed’’ is developing
into a mantra suggesting that fundamental rights and freedoms
are a luxury that security cannot afford. [.] the Home Secre-
tary of the United Kingdom, Dr John Reid, called for human
rights law to be rewritten, stating that ‘‘The right to security, to
the protection of life and liberty, is and should be the basic
right on which all others are based’’. [.]This position could be
potentially dangerous and may produce more problems than it
seeks to solve. There should be no doubt that effective anti-
terror measures can be framed within the boundaries of fundamental
rights. It is these rights that need to be protected under all circum-
stances in a democratic society. In the past examples can be found
in different parts of Europe where the failure to protect
fundamental rights has served as source of continued unrest
rather than ensure safety and stability (CEPD, «Letters to the
incoming presidency: fundamental rights are not captives of
security», 11 June 2007, available at http://www.edps.europa.eu/
EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/
Comments/2007/07-06-11_Letters_portuguese_presidency_EN.pdf).fundamental precondition so that other rights and liberties
can be exercised.747.2. There is the challenge
At present, those responsible for protecting our freedoms do
not seem to be up to the job. It is not a question here of human
or financial resources but a lack of allies. The state, which has
traditionally been the guarantor of our liberties, is more and
more interested by the advantages that technology can bring
in terms of efficiency and security. The public themselves
seem more fascinated by the technology than fearful of the
risks its use creates. The cause of freedom seems very remote
and difficult to defend when citizens are more concerned with
the imperatives of the short term.7.3. How to meet this challenge?
This can be achieved, no doubt, by lifting the veil of the network
that surrounds us: education that allows the understanding of
legislation that has incomprehensible language; legislation
that makes sense when it embraces all the kinds of data we put
out there on the web in sites such as FACEBOOK; when we show
consumers how publicity works on the net; or when employees
discover how employers can use the traces left by their GPS or
their cell phone or their computer to their detriment.
Creating new alliances between these representatives of
freedom, consumer groups and unions is a second objective
for all those authorities in charge of data protection. These
Data Protection Authorities must always remember that they
are not by nature independent. This can only be earned by the
constant effort to be and remain independent.
Professor Yves Poullet (yves.poullet@fundp.ac.be) CLSR Editorial
Board, Director, Centre for Information and Law (CRID), University
of Namur, Belgium http://www.crid.be.74 As expressed by BURKERT, privacy might be considered
a ‘‘fundamentally fundamental right’’. Privacy is not a freedom on
the same rank than the others: essential to human dignity and
individual autonomy, and translating these moral principles in
the legal sphere. Privacy is a necessary precondition to the
enjoyment of most other fundamental rights and freedoms (in
H. BURKERT, ‘Dualities of Privacy – An Introduction to ‘Personal
Data Protection and Fundamental Rights’’, in Challenges of Privacy
and Data Protection Law, M.V. Perez, A. Palazzi (eds), Cahier du
Crid, no. 31, Bruylant, Bruxelles, p. 14).
